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Chapter 4
Epistemic Vices in Public Debate: The Case 
of ‘New Atheism’
Ian James Kidd
Abstract Critics often complain that the ‘new atheists’ are arrogant, dogmatic, 
closed-minded and so on. Those terms denote ‘epistemic (or intellectual) vices’, or 
vices of the mind, so we can call those criticisms ‘vice charges’. Although they are 
very common, it is unclear whether they are merely rhetorical or whether they are 
substantive criticisms. The aim of this chapter is therefore to offer a framework for 
articulating and assessing these charges. I offer such a framework and consider two 
specific vices—arrogance and dogmatism—and ask, in each case, whether new 
atheists are vulnerable to a charge of vice. My conclusions are that: vice-charges are 
far more complex than critics appreciate; that critics can, at the least, say that certain 
new atheists may well be vulnerable to certain charges of epistemic vice; and that 
much more work needs to be done before one can charge new atheists with vices in 
a fair and robust way.
Keywords Arrogance • Dogmatism • Epistemic vice • New atheism • Virtue 
epistemology
The cluster of writers known as the ‘New Atheists’ have been subjected to many 
different forms of criticism during their relatively brief history. These range from 
the adequacy of their historical understanding to the poverty of their conception of 
a religious life: for instance, of their ‘profound unfamiliarity with the traditions, 
beliefs, and culture … richness and complexity [and] historical context’ of the reli-
gious traditions that they engage with (Dickson 2010, 53). There is now a vibrant 
publishing industry devoted to the articulation and assessment of these various criti-
cal charges—including, of course, this volume—and the issues are also rehearsed in 
radio and television shows, blogs and other online fora, and elsewhere.
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Certainly the usual criticisms made of the New Atheists are well known—for 
instance, that they are historically naive, philosophically unsophisticated, theologi-
cally confused—and many critics emphasize the ramified character of these prob-
lems. In this chapter, my concern is with a set of criticisms that, though quite 
familiar, are surprisingly neglected in the literature on the New Atheists: that the 
New Atheists typically evince negative character traits, or vices, such as arrogance, 
dogmatism, and closed-mindedness. Of course the invocation of vices in the context 
of criticisms of New Atheism is hardly surprising—the title that Prospect magazine 
gave to its review of The God Delusion was ‘Dawkins the dogmatist’ (Brown 2006).
But although such vice charges are practically de rigeur, they have enjoyed much 
less scholarly appraisal. It is one thing to complain that Dawkins is a dogmatist, but 
quite another to actually articulate this as a robust and defensible form of criti-
cism—if, indeed, such complaints are meant to be more than merely reactive rheto-
ric. It is easy to charge someone with arrogance, but quite another thing to actually 
cash this out in a properly procedural way—something that a reasonable critic owes 
to the person they are criticising. My aim in this chapter is therefore to articulate and 
assess the vice charge as deployed as a form of criticism of the New Atheists, and to 
do this I will appeal to the resources of virtue epistemology, an emerging area of 
philosophy whose concern is with the epistemic virtues and their associated vices. I 
do not claim here that the New Atheists are epistemically vicious or that they are 
virtuous: my aim is to demonstrate the complexity of the practice of charging peo-
ple with epistemic vices and show that it is much harder to make properly robust 
charges of vice than many critics who talk of the ‘arrogance’ and ‘dogmatism’ of 
the New Atheism suppose.
4.1  Virtue Epistemology and the Virtues and Vices 
of the Mind
The starting point of virtue epistemology is the perception of important relation-
ships between enquiry and character. The term ‘enquiry’ should be understood 
broadly to refer to those activities involved in the acquisition, assessment, and appli-
cation of knowledge—and so might include juridical deliberation, studying ancient 
texts, or arguing about the quickest route home. The term ‘character’ refers to a 
person’s characteristics: stable dispositions to adopt certain forms of behaviour, of 
either a positive or a negative character—for instance, to be either aggressive or 
charitable when engaging in the epistemic practice of criticising others. In philo-
sophical parlance, negative character traits are vices and positive character traits are 
virtues, and an ambition of virtue epistemology is to explore the relationships 
between character and enquiry. As one leading virtue epistemologist explains, 
enquiry makes ‘certain fairly generic demands on us as cognitive agents, and … the 
possession of different clusters of epistemic virtues equips us to meet or overcome 
these demands’ (Baehr 2011, 18). In practice, this involves identifying a range of 
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different epistemic virtues and vices—such as curiosity and humility, arrogance and 
dogmatism—and exploring how they affect a person or group’s capacity to acquire, 
assess, and apply knowledge through epistemic practices like theorising, debating, 
and investigating. Some virtues, like truthfulness, may have a universal scope within 
human life, whereas others, like epistemic courage, apply only to certain agents in 
certain conditions (see Baehr 2011, Chap. 1; Roberts and Wood 2007, Chap. 2–5). 
The epistemic vices are negative epistemic character traits. Familiar ones includes 
arrogance and dogmatism, upon which I focus, but also less familiar ones, such as 
epistemic injustice and epistemic insensibility. Heather Battaly (2014) distinguishes 
two main concepts of epistemic vice which explain what is objectionable about 
them: a reliablist argues that the vices of the mind are character traits that have bad 
epistemic effects (inattentiveness leads a person to fail to notice or ‘attend to’ 
important aspects of a situation or pieces of information, say) while a responsibilist 
argues that the vices reflect a bad psychology (an epistemically cowardly person 
does not assign to truth a high enough value, so keeps their mouth shut when they 
ought to speak out). I think that vice-charges can use either a reliabilist or a respon-
sibilist concept of vice, but the distinction matters: if the New Atheists are indeed 
epistemically vicious, it might be by virtue of the bad effects of their conduct, or due 
to their objectionable psychologies or motivations, or indeed some combination of 
these. The virtue epistemologist is therefore concerned to identify and individuate 
the range of different epistemic virtues and vices and to understand how they relate 
to one another and contribute to enquiry at both the individual and the group level 
(see Cassam 2016).1
In this chapter, then, my aim is to use virtue epistemology to articulate and assess 
the vice charge as directed against New Atheism. I make four related claims. First, 
that virtue epistemology can help provide a normative basis for the vice charge and 
so to indicate that it can elevate a rhetorical device into a robust form of criticism. 
Second, to make good on this claim by offering case studies of the vices of epis-
temic arrogance and epistemic dogmatism and to suggest that, at least in the case of 
these two, a robust vice charge could be provided. Third, to rebut an objection to my 
claim that a robust vice charge could be a legitimate style of criticism: namely, that 
a vice charge is an ad hominem attack. It emerges that robust forms of charges of 
epistemic arrogance and epistemic dogmatism could be directed against the New 
Atheists, even if securing that charge in a suitably documentary manner is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. The chapter closes by sketching out further ways of devel-
oping the vice charge by integrating virtue epistemology with sociological studies 
of New Atheism.
1 Battaly (2016) identifies a third position – ‘personalism’ – according to which a person can come 
to possess epistemic vices (and virtues) without their being responsible for doing so. If so, even if 
the New Atheists are epistemically vicious, they need not be responsible for being so – a consider-
ation that those who deploy vice charges against them should carefully consider.
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4.2  New Atheism and Epistemic Vices
Since the vice charge is often tacitly present in the writings of both advocates and 
critics of New Atheism it is important to spell out what a properly robust vice charge 
would entail. One thing is to specify the concept of epistemic vice at work, whether 
reliabilist or responsibilist, since these give different but not necessarily incompat-
ible accounts of the wrong of epistemic vice. Another, on which I focus here, is to 
specify the form of the charge. (A fuller account of the practice of vice-charging is 
given in Kidd 2016).
It is important to distinguish explicit from implicit forms of the vice charge. An 
explicit vice charge is one that deploys a vocabulary of virtues and vices for critical 
purposes; for instance when Alister McGrath and Joanna Collicutt McGrath (2007, 
xii) challenge the ‘total dogmatic conviction of correctness’ and the perceived 
‘resistan[ce] to the calibration of his own certainties’ that, in their judgement, char-
acterizes both Dawkins’ writings and public statements. It is easy enough to identify 
other examples of explicit vice charges directed against the New Atheists that invoke 
epistemic vices— of their being, inter alia, ‘contemptuous’ (Lennox 2011, 187), 
‘hubristic’ (Beattie 2007, 148), and ‘intolerant’ (Haught 2008, 10). But a vice 
charge can also be implicit in the descriptive and evaluative language that is used to 
describe the New Atheists character, tone, rhetoric, statements, or views; an article 
in The Guardian newspaper, entitled ‘Aggressive Atheists’, decried the tendency of 
the New Atheists to ‘pour scorn upon religious belief’ and to offer nothing but ‘hos-
tility to religion’ (Bunting 2011). Other examples of implicit vice charges might 
include the suggestion that the programmatic aims of New Atheism can be under-
stood in terms of various ‘reductions’—of the ‘cultural role of theology’, say, or 
‘the meaning of faith to mindless belief’—that could easily be interpreted as reflect-
ing epistemic vices (Haught 2008, 38).
The vice charge can therefore take implicit and explicit forms, and it will gener-
ally be easier to critically assess a vice charge when it takes more explicit forms—
for then it becomes easier to identify the particular vices being invoked and to begin 
the philosophical task of determining whether the critic can provide a defensible 
account of them.
The subjects of a vice charge—in this case, New Atheists—of course usually 
reject the vice charge. The rejection of a vice charge may be a default response, but 
it may be the result of decision and deliberation, and in these cases analysis of the 
response can be instructive. For instance, if a person rejects the charge that they are 
arrogant, it is often possible to identify how they are tacitly conceiving that vice, 
and this opens up the possibility of critically assessing that conception. Dawkins, 
for instance, has argued that the ‘God Hypothesis’ is not ‘dogmatic’ because it is a 
‘scientific hypothesis’, and so can be ‘analysed … sceptically’ in a way that reli-
gious beliefs cannot be (Dawkins 2006, 24). In this case, Dawkins rejects the charge 
of dogmatism on the grounds that certain features of the epistemology of scientific 
enquiry are intrinsically anti-dogmatic—and this is a case that can be subjected to 
critical scrutiny. If Dawkins is right, what seems like vigorous dogmatism is, in fact, 
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a robust sort of epistemic confidence. Similarly Dale McGowan has challenged the 
vice charge, by arguing that atheists, in fact, tend to be ‘humble’, ‘open’, and ‘relent-
lessly, exhaustively honest’ owing to their enlightened intellectual sensibilities 
(quoted in Nall 2010, 193). McGowan rejects the vice charge by invoking several 
virtues, and this opens up the possibility of defining and debating both the charge 
and the response.
The vice charge can therefore take both implicit and explicit forms and careful 
attention to the specifics of the charge and of the responses to it by New Atheists can 
be critically instructive. It also indicates a clear role for virtue and vice epistemol-
ogy, and especially for what Jason Baehr calls ‘applied virtue epistemology’, which 
studies how epistemic virtues and vices operate in specific domains, such as sci-
ence, education, media, and the law (Baehr 2011, 201).
It should also be clear that the vice charge is not isolated from the other forms of 
criticism that are directed at the New Atheists. Since a core virtue epistemological 
conviction is that character and enquiry are intimately related, this is just what one 
would expect. A person’s vices will, after all, inform and shape how they engage 
with other enquirers, how they respond to certain ideas, and so on—what one might 
call their epistemic conduct. In the case of New Atheism, the vice charge relates to 
two wider sets of complaints commonly made by their critics.
The first is a cognitive complaint—that the New Atheists tend to produce and 
operate with accounts of, say, the history of science or the nature of religious belief 
that are confused, insufficiently sophisticated, or intellectually questionable. A 
commonly cited example is Dawkins’ definition of faith as ‘blind trust, in the 
absence of faith’ that is grounded in a ‘process of non-thinking’ (Dawkins 1976, 
192). Alister McGrath and Joanna Collicutt McGrath have objected that this defini-
tion is not only unfamiliar to Christian theology, but also an obviously self-serving 
one that Dawkins has ‘invented to suit his own polemical purposes’ by defining 
those with religious faith as necessarily ‘deluded’ (McGrath and McGrath 2007, 
17–18).2 Self-serving definitions are objectionable partly due to their partisan char-
acter, partly due to their incapacity to sustain intellectual debate, and partly due to 
their lack of serious engagement with the enormous academic literature (psycho-
logical, philosophical, theological) on topics, such as the nature of faith, with which 
any serious critic ought to be conversant, especially if one’s ambition is, like that of 
the New Atheists, to provide critiques of religion. The emphasis upon the need for 
engagement with the academic scholarship of course also applies to those religious 
persons who wish to inform and guide public debate on science, religion, and 
society.
The second broad complaint against the New Atheists is a conduct complaint. 
This refers to the tendency of the New Atheists to conduct themselves, in their writ-
ings and their debates, in ways that minimize the possibilities for productive intel-
lectual engagement. Richard Cimino and Christopher Smith (2010) speak for many 
when they complain that the New Atheists are typically ‘contentious, divisive … [,] 
mean-spirited [and] aggressive’ in a way that erodes the opportunities for ‘rational 
2 On the topic of ‘faith’ see Bishop (2010).
4 Epistemic Vices in Public Debate: The Case of ‘New Atheism’
56
deliberation and exchange’ (2010, 152). Richard Harries complains that the ‘pre-
dominant tone … of intellectual righteousness’ that characterizes the stylistic and 
rhetorical features of New Atheist writings tends to impede debate (2010, xi). 
McGrath and McGrath offer a blunter statement of the conduct complaint in their 
remark that it was difficult to write a response to The God Delusion, ‘an aggregation 
of convenient factoids suitably overstated to achieve maximum impact and loosely 
arranged to suggest that they constitute an argument’ (2007, 13). Although no vices 
are stated here, the features of the book that the McGraths complain about—such as 
rhetorical overstatement and argumentative disorganization—are all symptomatic 
of epistemic vices (for example, a truthful person does not overstate or exaggerate). 
The collective result of the forms of epistemic conduct generally employed by the 
New Atheists is that the possibility of ‘calm, rational debate’ is increasingly mini-
mized (Elsdon-Baker 2009, 2). Indeed, a mature debate is partly defined in terms of 
its participants’ adoption of the appropriate stances, attitude, and tone—that is, of a 
certain form of epistemic conduct defined in terms of epistemic virtues.
The cognitive and conduct complaints converge in the worry that the New 
Atheists are generally resistant to intellectual engagement owing to the inadequa-
cies of their knowledge and understanding of the relevant issues and the rhetorics 
and behaviours that characterize their conduct. Or put another way, they get too 
much wrong and are needlessly difficult to talk to, and these two complaints are 
directly related to the vice charge. A dogmatic person will persist with certain pre-
ferred concepts and theories despite legitimate objections from other enquirers; an 
arrogant person will assert the superiority of their own interpretations despite the 
availability of alternatives that they ought to recognize as plausible—and so on. 
Such vices can encourage an aggressively adversarial stance that presupposes the 
cognitive inadequacies of one’s opponents in a way that excludes the possibility of 
constructive dialogue with them. If the vices become increasingly entrenched, the 
vicious person can become effectively closed off to opportunities for criticism, cor-
rection, and instruction, and so ceases to be an effective participant in collective 
enquiry. And if this is so, then the vice charge is doing real critical work, for charges 
of arrogance and dogmatism cease to be incidental asides—rhetorical icing on the 
argumentative cake—but a legitimate form of criticism that focuses on the correla-
tions between the epistemic character of the New Atheists and the content of the 
cognitive and conduct complaints.
Such a critical strategy sounds promising, but it is premised upon the provision 
of robust accounts of the vices that are being called into play. It is easy—too easy, 
in fact—to exchange charges of arrogance or dogmatism, and this encourages the 
sense that the critical practice of charging others with vice is mere rhetoric. A vice 
charge will, after all, falter in the absence of a philosophically articulated account of 
the vice in question, and so to make a robust vice charge a critic should be able to 
provide those accounts. The aim of this chapter is to make good on these claims on 
behalf of the legitimacy of directing a vice charge against the New Atheists. In the 
next two sections I offer accounts of the vices of epistemic arrogance and epistemic 
dogmatism, respectively, including the sorts of conduct they will typically manifest 
in. This is followed by a consideration of an objection to the critical practice of vice 
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charging that will both clarify some of its features and secure its status as a legiti-
mate form of criticism. It emerges that New Atheists are indeed vulnerable to the 
specific charges of epistemic arrogance and epistemic dogmatism—as critics have 
suspected. But whether those charges can be made to stick is one that it is not yet 
possible to determine, in advance of the provision of genuinely robust vice charges.
4.3  Epistemic Arrogance
In this section, I provide an account of the vice of epistemic arrogance inspired by 
the work of Roberts and Wood (2007). That vice consists in a disposition to draw 
illicit inferences to entitlements and exemptions whose consequence is the violation 
and erosion of the epistemic norms that regulate collective enquiry. I aim to show 
that it is plausible to argue that the New Atheists are typically guilty of epistemic 
arrogance.
The success of enquiry depends upon the fact that the participants will know and 
observe the appropriate norms of epistemic conduct. These epistemic norms are like 
social norms in that they facilitate collective activity by establishing shared stan-
dards of conduct—prescribing certain forms of behaviour, proscribing others—in a 
way that minimizes conflict and maximizes cooperation (see Pritchard 2010, Chap. 
5). There are many epistemic norms of varying degrees of complexity and specific-
ity, but a useful illustrative example is the ‘principle of charity’: the requirement that 
a person should seek to maximize the truth or rationality of what other persons think 
and say—for instance, by charitably interpreting imperfections in the verbal articu-
lation of a claim as an indicator of anxiety rather than inability. This is an epistemic 
norm because it will tend to establish social conditions—in the classroom or at a 
conference—that are maximally conductive to enquiry, for instance by encouraging 
participants to freely advance tentative claims or speculative ideas without fear of 
instant critical retribution (see Gauker 1986).
Although such epistemic norms are—like social norms—often violated, this is 
not always a bad thing because situations can be imagined in which the strict obser-
vance of certain norms may in fact compromise or undermine enquiry.3 So the claim 
is not that observing epistemic norms will always be good for enquiry nor that 
enquiry will always succeed if one does observe them, for the reason that the suc-
cess or failure of enquiry is contingent upon a complex range of factors, many of 
which will be beyond the knowledge or control of the epistemic agents involved. 
Instead, the claim is that the observance of epistemic norms will typically be condu-
cive to enquiry and that their suspension or violation should therefore be the result 
of careful deliberation rather than being part of intellectual business-as-usual. The 
term ‘norm’, after all, indicates something that will in the majority of typical cases 
be efficacious and therefore to be respected, rather than subjected to arbitrary sus-
pension or violation. It is a social norm that one should not interrupt a person while 
they are speaking—for to do so is rudeness, a vice—but it is, of course, permissible 
3 A classic defence of this claim is Feyerabend (1975).
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to violate that norm if the interruption is required to warn the speaker of some immi-
nent danger. An important feature of a good enquirer is therefore the skill of know-
ing when to respect a norm, and to what degree, and when to suspend or violate it, 
and to be willing and able to account for their decisions to do so. Such a person has 
what Aristotle called ‘practical wisdom’ (phronesis).4
A person who suspends or violates epistemic norms in an arbitrary or unjustifi-
able manner threatens the possibility of productive collective enquiry in one or both 
of two ways. First, they will tend to undermine the social conditions of enquiry; for 
instance, by creating a hostile environment that discourages the sorts of tentative 
speculation that is often helpful in debates about new and unfamiliar topics. The 
members of a community in which the principle of charity is not observed will 
likely find it difficult to offer incomplete or inarticulate ideas because they know 
that their peers cannot be relied upon to help bring them into a state of completion 
or articulacy. Second, prolonged instances of the arbitrary suspension and violation 
of epistemic norms will tend to erode the status of those norms and gradually under-
mine the integrity of the relevant community. Norms can, of course, survive occa-
sional suspension or violation in cases where there is good reason—as a calculated 
bet that paid off, say—or where the violation was arbitrary but incidental and ‘one 
off’, for instance as a result of the tolerable immaturity of a junior or inexperienced 
colleague. But when epistemic norms are subjected to sustained and deliberate 
abuse the result is that they will begin to break down, and, gradually, systematic 
damage will be done to both the social conditions of enquiry and the integrity of the 
system of norms upon which enquiry depends.5
With this account of the role of epistemic norms in place, I can explain how they 
relate to the vice of epistemic arrogance—and therefore to the New Atheists. There 
are several accounts of the vice of arrogance in its ethical and epistemic forms avail-
able in the philosophical literature, but the following discussion will rely upon that 
offered by the virtue epistemologists Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood (2007). 
They argue that epistemic arrogance ought to be understood as a ‘motivated disposi-
tion to infer illicitly some entitlement from one’s superiority to others’, for instance 
by judging oneself to be entitled to privileged status, treatment, or rights by virtue 
of their intellectual or social superiority (2007, 77). What makes this an epistemic 
vice is the fact that the entitlements claimed are epistemic in character; that is, per-
taining to knowledge, understanding, and enquiry.
These inferences could be made implicitly or explicitly, such that a person can be 
un-self-consciously arrogant, not least since a psychological feature of arrogance is 
that it often ‘functions as a barrier to the arrogant person’s acquiring information 
from others’ (Tiberius and Walker 1998, 383). We might therefore distinguish 
4 The concept of phronesis is central to Aristotle’s ethics; a classic statement is Nicomachean 
Ethics, Book 5, 1,144b.
5 A good example of social norms and the integrity of communities is Robert K. Merton’s classic 
studies in the sociology of science—see, e.g., Merton (1938). It is interesting that his work was 
motivated by a sense of ‘active hostility to science’ from certain quarters of his society—the same 
perception that informs the New Atheists now.
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between different forms of arrogance: a person who is oblivious to the fact of their 
arrogance but who would, if challenged, be open to correction is weakly arrogant, 
whereas a person who is conscious of their arrogance and would retain it even if 
challenged is strongly arrogant. Those two positions of course mark the end points 
of a spectrum, and Roberts and Wood are correct in their judgment that it is the 
strongly arrogant persons who really merit the label of ‘arrogance’—for their arro-
gance incorporates a ‘certain resistance to correction’ (2007, 245–246). The diffi-
culty is to persuade people that they are being arrogant, rather than, say, strongly 
committed or robustly confident.6
The epistemically arrogant person is therefore characterized by a disposition to 
draw illicit privileges, which can be grouped into two kinds: entitlements and 
exemptions (see Roberts and Wood 2007, 243–244ff). Strictly speaking, the latter is 
a sub-set of the former, but there is exegetical value in distinguishing them from one 
another. An inference to entitlement can take many forms, such as supposing oneself 
to be entitled to privileges such as acting in ways that one would ordinarily be 
denied; or the right to access or occupy positions of social or intellectual authority 
which are typically conditional upon the attainment of qualifications or experiences; 
or to an enhanced degree of priority or power within a given community or activ-
ity—like debating a complex issue at a conference—despite competing claims by 
one’s peers. In each of these sorts of cases, the epistemically arrogant person pre- 
emptively judges themselves to be entitled to certain privileges, powers, and priority 
for which they lack proper warrant—they overstep themselves or “act above their 
station.” Moreover, the arrogant person fails to fulfil the requirements of what Philip 
Quadrio (this volume) calls the ‘role morality of the scholar’—for a dogmatic, reac-
tionary scholar who fails to recognize or observe the rules of academic enquiry and 
engagement compromises their authority.
An inference to exemption involves the arrogant person supposing that they are 
exempted from certain requirements or constraints that do, in fact, apply to them. 
An arrogant person might, for instance, suppose themselves to be exempted from 
certain practices or procedures that apply to all epistemic agents (e.g. having their 
journal papers peer reviewed); or supposing themselves to be exempted from the 
need to respect the authority of experts in a given field (e.g. by dismissing the views 
of acknowledged authorities on a given topic); or judging themselves to be compe-
tent to discourse confidently on topics despite not having the requisite knowledge 
and understanding—what some call ‘grandstanding.’ Although these examples are 
far from exhaustive, they indicate the different ways in which an arrogant person 
can illicitly and illegitimately exempt themselves from requirements and standards 
that, in fact, do apply to them.
Such inferrals to entitlement and to exemption can have a range of negative 
social and epistemic consequences. A short list might include provoking anger, frus-
tration, or discomfort; or by interfering with the process of enquiry; or by setting a 
bad professional and pedagogical example to undergraduate and postgraduate stu-
6 I develop this problem by distinguishing the definition and the exemplification of epistemic vice 
in Kidd (2016, §6).
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dents; or by requiring members of the relevant epistemic community to enact disci-
plinary procedures in order to censure or interdict the arrogant person (see Reznik 
1998, Chap. 4–5). But a deeper consequence of such arrogant behaviour is that it 
can, especially in intense and prolonged cases, gradually erode the epistemic norms 
that govern the relevant epistemic community, most obviously the norms that regu-
late the allocation of epistemic entitlement and exemptions. In the short term, such 
norm violation may be irritating but only minimally disruptive, especially if the 
violators are quickly identified and interdicted by sharp-eyed chairs of conference 
panels or vigilant journal referees. In the long term, however, such sustained arro-
gant behaviour can become increasingly disruptive and place increasing pressure 
upon the norms, those who attempt to respect and enforce them, and those who are 
charged with protecting and enforcing them. Such norms, after all, only continue to 
exist insofar as they are recognized and enforced by the members of a given 
community.
The vice of epistemic arrogance is, then, a disposition to draw illicit inferrals to 
entitlements and exemptions whose consequence is the violation of the epistemic 
norms that govern and grant integrity to a community of enquirers. The question of 
whether the New Atheists are epistemically arrogant can now be asked, though my 
aim is not to offer a definitive answer—too big a task for a single chapter—but 
rather to secure the more modest claim that the answer is likely to be in the 
affirmative.
On my analysis, the New Atheists are vulnerable to a charge of epistemic arro-
gance for at least two reasons. The first is that it is easy to identify in the writings 
and statements of the New Atheists plausible examples of the sorts of illicit inferrals 
to entitlement and exemption that characterize epistemic arrogance. Their tendency 
to establish and assert conceptions of the nature of religious faith without consulta-
tion of the relevant theological, philosophical, and social scientific literature can 
now be reinterpreted as epistemic arrogance: specifically, entitlement to hold forth 
on faith. Another example is the reliance of the New Atheists on an historical 
account of the relationship between science and religion that historians call the 
Conflict Model (see Cantor and Kenny 2001). Such a model has obvious rhetorical 
and polemical value for the New Atheists, but historians of science and religion are 
quick to emphasize two important points. First, the Conflict Model is one model of 
that historical relationship amongst others, and that its merits over those alternatives 
must be argued for. Indeed, the other models have names like ‘Independence,’ 
‘Dialogue,’ and ‘Integration.’ Second, the Conflict Model is deeply suspect: it is 
‘hackneyed but popular’ (Dixon 2010, 1), ‘serve[s] polemical rather than analytical 
purposes’ (Turner 2010, 88), obscures the ‘variety and complexity’ of the science- 
religion relationship (Lindberg 2010, 34)—to cite just three distinguished historians 
of science. Third, the task of developing and debating the relationship between sci-
ence and religion requires careful and disciplined historical skill and historiographi-
cal sensitivity, and none of the New Atheists typically evince either. This is evident 
enough from their reliance on various ‘myths’ about science and religion, several of 
which are refuted in a recent book entitled Galileo Goes To Jail and Other Myths 
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About Science and Religion (Numbers 2009). Given the importance of historical 
narratives to the polemical and critical strategies of the New Atheists, these attitudes 
towards the discipline and the practitioners of the history of science are unfortunate. 
Still, it is clear enough that many of the claims that the New Atheists make about the 
historical relationship of science and religion can only be sustained if they exempt 
themselves from the scholarly obligation to take seriously the deliverances of the 
relevant community of historians.
The second reason why the New Atheists are vulnerable to a charge of epistemic 
arrogance is that they tend to adopt self-images that encourage a sense of their own 
superlative intellectual ability and integrity. It is a common New Atheist claim that 
atheism is a form of rationally impeccable intellectual stance—hence an allied rhet-
oric of ‘Brights’ and ‘freethinkers’—who are uncorrupted by the biases and preju-
dices that, they allege, are the fuel of irrationalism, superstition, and religious belief. 
On this view, it is only atheists who possess the ‘courage to face the universe in the 
light of reason’, free from subordination to ‘religious authority’ and a ‘supernatural 
creator’ (Kurtz 1997, 37). Only atheists, says Dawkins, resist the religious invitation 
to ‘evade the need to think and to evaluate evidence’ and so to achieve intellectual 
responsibility (1976, 198). Such self-images of New Atheism are designed to attri-
bute to them various honorific features, including intellectual responsibility, immu-
nity to bias, and moral courage. This, in turn, introduces into New Atheist self-images 
a structural tendency towards epistemic arrogance: for self-attribution of intellectual 
and moral superiority provides the necessary basis for the illicit inferral of entitle-
ments and exemptions that is a precondition for epistemic arrogance. Such self- 
images are, then, structurally vulnerable to epistemic arrogance (see Jones and 
Martin 2004).
The charge of epistemic arrogance against the New Atheists is therefore likely to 
succeed given that the three core components—sense of superiority, entitlement- 
inferral, and exemption-inferral—are all present in New Atheist self-images, and in 
their demonstrated behaviours and attitudes. Given that the New Atheists have per-
sisted in their sense of superiority and their dispositions of inferral, it is plausible to 
argue that they are strongly arrogant, and even if one demurs, then at least a work-
ing basis for articulating and assessing that charge is now in place.
4.4  Epistemic Dogmatism
Another vice with which the New Atheists are typically charged is dogmatism. In 
this section, I offer an account of the vice of epistemic dogmatism, again based on 
the account offered by Roberts and Wood, and use it to make plausible the claim that 
the New Atheists are vulnerable to a charge of epistemic dogmatism.
There are different possible bases for an objection to dogmatism, but a common 
complaint is that it impairs a person’s capacity to engage in foundational epistemic 
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practices (these being the sorts of practices that are essential to epistemic life). Two 
such foundational epistemic practices are instruction and criticism: the former 
involves the imparting of epistemic goods, like skills and knowledge, to others, and 
the latter refers to the modification or rejection of claims, arguments, and conclu-
sions that a person is either contemplating or has accepted. Each of these practices 
can, of course, take many different forms. Instruction can be formal or informal, 
active or passive, and might range from self-directed learning, reading books and 
blogs, listening to lectures, studying for degrees, undertaking academic research, 
and so on. Criticism might also range from self-reflexive assessment of one’s beliefs, 
formalized critical debate with teachers or peers, invitations by others to clarify 
certain concepts that one uses, or the offering of explicit objections to conclusions 
that one has drawn. Often these two broad forms of epistemic practice converge, for 
instance if a teacher decides to criticize a student’s confidently jingoistic claims 
about the merits of British imperialism by acquainting them with certain facts about 
the deleterious effects it had upon aboriginal peoples in the former colonial territo-
ries. (One might suppose that a good teacher is one able to appreciate what forms of 
instruction and criticism are appropriate).
It is likely that most forms of epistemic activity, whether convivial coffee shop 
conversations about capitalism or high-level academic disputes about causality, will 
involve a complex cluster of simultaneous practices of instruction and of criticism. 
An obvious precondition, though, for successful participation in practices of instruc-
tion and of criticism is that a person can respond appropriately to those persons—
such as teachers or peers—who are offering the instruction and criticism. Many 
educationalists have in fact argued that a foundational aim of education is the culti-
vation of a mature intellectual character; for instance, a student who is able to 
restrain unreflective responses to problems posed and to patiently and diligently 
consider alternative views, and so on (see Baehr 2015; Kotzee 2013). The American 
philosopher of education, John Dewey, argued that a primary purpose of education 
is the development, in the student, of a capacity for ‘trained reflection,’ such that 
they become careful and considered in their judgements and responses, and so ‘free 
from routine and … caprice’ (1998, 67–68). A student with these qualities and vir-
tues will of course be more receptive to instruction by, and critical engagement with, 
other enquirers and so would be an effective participant in collective enquiry. I sug-
gest that epistemic dogmatism can be understood—at least in part—as an entrenched 
incapacity of certain persons to respond appropriately to attempts by others at 
instruction and criticism.
Once again, Roberts and Wood offer a robust account of the vice of epistemic 
dogmatism, which they identify as a specific form of ‘epistemic rigidity’. The epis-
temically dogmatic person has a ‘disposition to respond irrationally to oppositions’ 
to certain of their beliefs (2007, 195). These irrational responses can, of course, take 
very many forms, but they would include the following: failing to respond in appro-
priately rational ways to criticism and objection (e.g. sneering or ridiculing; being 
fatuous or hyperbolic); insistently polarising subtly nuanced views; ignoring or dis-
missing criticisms in a derogatory manner; deliberately exaggerating or distorting 
the criticisms directed against them; adopting an accusatory and aggressive stance 
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that fails to respect reasonable social and epistemic norms—to offer just a few. 
These forms of dogmatic behaviour are often awkward and unpleasant, but of course 
they will tend to have negative epistemic consequences; for instance, the dogmatist 
‘turns wilfully away from insights into the force of his interlocutor’s objections’, 
and instead ‘calls to his aid arguments that he knows or half-knows to be dodges’ 
(Roberts and Wood 2007, 195). In such cases, debate is therefore impaired rather 
than advanced, as bad arguments—or historical ‘myths’—are predictably repeated 
while good ones are ignored and dismissed (see Kidd 2015, 2017).
It is worth noting that, though Roberts and Wood characterize dogmatism in 
terms of irrational responsiveness to criticism, their account works very well for 
instruction, too. The reason is that the distinction between criticism and instruction 
is, as argued earlier, hardly a sharp one; many practices of criticism necessarily 
involve some degree of instruction, since people often get things wrong—and so 
invite criticism—when their knowledge or understanding is deficient. A dogmatist 
may therefore be prone to interpret efforts by others to instruct them as forms of 
criticism and so mis-respond—one can challenge criticisms, but one ought not chal-
lenge an offer of information that one lacks but needs.
Characterising dogmatism in terms of a disposition to irrationally respond to 
criticism and instruction makes it easier to determine whether a person is being 
viciously dogmatic or virtuously self-confident, for two reasons. First, it is generally 
easier to judge what an irrational response to a critic or instructor might be because 
social and epistemic communities typically have well-established formal and infor-
mal norms of interpersonal engagement; that is, of appropriate forms of epistemic 
conduct. Second, Roberts and Wood emphasize that a robust charge of dogmatism 
should be grounded in a ‘[l]ong and detailed acquaintance’ with the character and 
conduct of the object of the charge, including the ‘mental strategies’ that they typi-
cally employ (2007, 195–196). A charge of dogmatism cannot be justified by a 
single instance of epistemic bad behaviour, since that might be the result of other 
non-culpable factors—such as insomnia, illness, or acute stress—not least because 
charging someone with vice based on a generalized inferral from a few instances 
may, itself, be epistemically vicious.
The vice of epistemic dogmatism can therefore be understood as a disposition to 
respond irrationally to attempts by others to offer instruction and criticism, and this 
vice renders a person increasingly resistant to epistemic engagement. It is easy 
enough to sketch out the conduct of a dogmatic person: they cannot be relied upon 
to offer mature and reasoned responses to their critics; they resort to dismissals, 
polemics, and ridicule; they create an uncomfortable social and epistemic environ-
ment and generate tensions and conflict; and they therefore undermine collective 
enquiry. But Roberts and Wood also add that a dogmatic person has a further fea-
ture, a ‘positive counterface,’ in the form of a ‘compulsion to recruit others to one’s 
position’ (2007, 195). A person who is dogmatically convinced of the superlative 
maturity and sophistication of their beliefs and convictions, whatever they might be, 
could of course quite naturally feel that they are compelled to convert individuals or 
groups with alternative beliefs and convictions. The foregoing account offers a set 
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of criteria by which one can determine whether or not the New Atheists are vulner-
able to a robust charge of epistemic dogmatism, and my suggestion is that they are.
First, the New Atheists do evince the disposition to offer irrational responses to 
criticism and instruction that Roberts and Wood identify as a characteristic of epis-
temic dogmatism. A familiar example is their persisting tendency to derogate reli-
gious persons as being, in Dawkins’ words, ‘victims’ of a ‘mind-virus’ (2006, 
216–218ff), or when Sam Harris describes Christian theology as the ‘story of book-
ish men’ promulgating ‘moral pretences’ (2011, 5, 48).7 The obvious polemical 
value of such pejorative rhetoric can be taken, by a critic, as a reflection of the 
epistemically arrogant disposition to respond irrationally to the attempts at instruc-
tion and criticism of religious persons, philosophers, and theologians. And it should 
be clear that the task of understanding the nature of a religious life is a difficult one, 
even for the epistemically virtuous.8
Second, many core New Atheist convictions and beliefs, such as that of the cog-
nitive immaturity of religious belief and the vacuity of theistic metaphysics, are 
liable to encourage irrational responses to religious persons and traditions. Certain 
beliefs and self-images can encourage epistemic vices, and Fern Elsdon-Baker has 
argued that the dogmatic aspects of Dawkins’ New Atheism is grounded partly in 
his ‘representation of the history and philosophy of science’ (2009, 178). For not 
only is that representation inaccurate and incomplete, but it is appealed to in order 
to justify the dogmatic derogation of religious persons: if one subscribes to the myth 
that science has been busily eroding the moral and epistemic credibility of religion 
since the seventeenth century, then an urge to dismiss and derogate religious per-
sons in the early twenty-first century can seem eminently justified.
Third, the New Atheists often demonstrate the ‘compulsion to recruit’ that 
Roberts and Wood suggested is the positive counterface to epistemic dogmatism. 
Some New Atheists express this compulsion negatively, as when Dawkins includes, 
as an appendix to The God Delusion, a ‘partial list of friendly addresses for those 
needing support in escaping from religion’ (2006, 421–427). Others can express 
that compulsion positively, as Dennett does in explicitly aligning himself with the 
‘Brights’, a group with self-attributively emancipatory ambitions (for instance, the 
establishment of a secular humanist society). These different forms of positive and 
negative recruitment strategies—of praising New Atheism and its allies, or derogat-
ing religious forms of life—of course pull together, but when coupled to the pattern 
of irrational responses, the ‘fit’ with Roberts and Wood’s account of epistemic dog-
matism is noteworthy. It is, then, plausible to argue that the New Atheists are vulner-
able to a charge of epistemic dogmatism, although, to repeat an earlier caveat, 
securing this charge is a task for another time.
7 While this may seem like I am singling out Dawkins, the reader is invited to find counterpoints in 
the writings of other New Atheists. Indeed, this is how the claims are to be tested.
8 I detail some of the epistemological and phenomenological difficulties of understanding the 
nature of religious lives in Kidd (2013) and (2014).
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4.5  An Objection
I have offered a way of articulating the vice charges directed against New Atheists 
that uses the resources of virtue epistemology. To actually appraise those charges is 
a job for another time, but one thing a budding vice charger must do is respond to 
an obvious objection to the practice. Call it the ad hominem objection.
The ad hominem objection goes as follows: the vice charge is an ad hominem 
attack that attempts to undermine a person’s claims by attacking their character, and 
so is guilty of the fallacy of irrelevance (see Walton 1998). It is good epistemic 
practice—so the objection goes—to judge claims and arguments on their own mer-
its, rather than by criticising the moral or intellectual qualities of the person who 
advances or defends them. If so, then critics of New Atheism ought to focus on the 
claims and argument of New Atheism rather than directing vice charges at particular 
New Atheists—so even if Dawkins does turn out to be dogmatic, that does not indi-
cate that he is wrong in his claims about science and religion. A person can dogmati-
cally defend views that are quite true, even if one dislikes the tone or manner or style 
in which they are articulated and defended.
The ad hominem objection can be rebutted if one can demonstrate that, in certain 
cases at least, critical appraisal of a person’s character is, in fact directly relevant to 
assessment of their arguments, beliefs, and claims. An effective version of this 
response has been developed by Heather Battaly (2010) in her argument that ad 
hominem arguments can be legitimate if they are directed at negative features of a 
person’s character—that is, their vices—that are relevant to appraisal of their epis-
temic performance. Battaly notes that much of our knowledge is acquired testimoni-
ally from others; this being so, certain epistemic virtues have an essential role in our 
reliable testimonial acquisition of knowledge from others—humility, say—and a 
person could therefore be criticized for lacking the virtues required to acquire 
knowledge from others (2010, 375). The vicious person lacks the capacities required 
to acquire knowledge from others in a reliable manner, and so their vice points to a 
deficiency in their epistemic capacities (see Aberdein 2014).
This suggests that certain forms of ad hominem criticism will be illegitimate, but 
that, in other cases, appraisal of the features of a person’s epistemic character is 
directly relevant to our appraisal of them as an enquirer. In the latter case, what the 
vice charging critic must do is to show that the New Atheists do have certain epis-
temic vices and that those vices are indeed relevant to appraisals of their epistemic 
conduct. In the cases of arrogance and dogmatism, for instance, it would have to be 
shown that the New Atheists do indeed have those characteristics and that they do 
impair their capacity to engage in collective epistemic practice—for instance, they 
are neither amenable to instruction nor responsive to criticism.
Taken together, the upshot is that in certain cases it will be epistemically legiti-
mate to criticize a person’s epistemic character traits, rather than, or as well as, their 
beliefs, arguments, and so on. But the critic has a lot of work to do to make these 
legitimate vice-charges: they must give robust accounts of the vices they want to 
invoke, explain how those vices manifest in epistemic and social conduct, and then 
do the careful, often painstaking work to show how and when those vices manifest 
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in the conduct of their target. My sense is that many vice charges against the New 
Atheists do not fulfil these conditions, at least as they stand, such that those charges 
have only a provisional status: they may be, but are not yet established to be, legiti-
mate charges. It is therefore too soon to tell whether the New Atheists are indeed 
epistemically vicious in the ways their critics confidently maintain. But hopefully 
we now have one way to assess and appraise those charges and thereby test the crit-
ics’ confidence.
4.6  Conclusions
The aim of this chapter has been to use the resources of virtue epistemology to 
articulate and assess the ‘vice charge’ in the context of New Atheism. It emerged 
that the New Atheists are indeed vulnerable to suitably robust charges of epistemic 
arrogance and epistemic dogmatism, and that critics who make robust vice charges 
are not guilty of making an ad hominem attack. Although it is not my claim that the 
New Atheists have been decisively shown to be epistemically arrogant and dog-
matic, the analysis offered indicates that they may be vulnerable to such charges. 
Therefore, those critics who want to argue that the New Atheists are epistemically 
vicious must therefore work harder to provide properly robust charges against them; 
otherwise, their charges of arrogance and dogmatism remain at a merely rhetorical 
level, and risk being guilty of fallacious ad hominem attacks.
It should be clear, too, that if a robust vice charge can be directed at the New 
Atheists, then we can point to two implications for public debate about science, 
religion, and society. One is that it will be important to develop and enforce stan-
dards and norms of good epistemic conduct, not least since complaints about the 
New Atheists often appeal to some conceptions of good conduct—of what it means 
to debate well, comport oneself during arguments, and so on. Another is that the 
point that one effective way to promote one’s positions is to conduct oneself accord-
ing to suitably high standards of epistemic conduct. The value of science, for 
instance, will be rooted not only in its predictive and explanatory power or its tech-
nological fecundity, but in the fact that it can offer an attractive ethos or attitude or 
stance, integral to which will be certain virtues, like truthfulness and integrity. Since 
this ideal clearly matters to the New Atheists, then virtue epistemology offers them 
means of developing their position.
It is worth closing by considering some further ways that virtue epistemology 
could be profitably integrated with sociology and other social sciences. To secure a 
robust charge of epistemic vice of the sort outlined in this chapter it is essential to 
have an empirically rich account of the typical behaviour of the target of the charge 
and an understanding of the social and institutional context in which those targets 
operate. Do the epistemic virtues of scientists and scholars differ from those of vari-
ous non-expert publics? Do those publics have conceptions of good epistemic con-
duct and the virtues that it entails? And so on. This will require the contributions of 
sociology—as other chapters in this collection indicate—as well as those of history, 
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theology and religious studies, and other disciplines. If so, then such interdisciplin-
ary engagement will be an important feature of the development of ‘applied virtue 
epistemology’ into the future. More generally, a willingness to acknowledge a need 
for other disciplines and an ability to participate in collective enquiry is a hallmark 
of epistemic virtue, and therefore something to be welcomed.9
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